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PRIVATIZATION IN PRACTICE:
HUMAN SERVICES
PROFESSOR DILLER: I just want to give a brief introduction
of our panelists.
To my immediate left is Anna Burger, who is with SEIU, the
Service Employees International Union, which is the largest union
representing human services employees.
To her left is Jackie Boggess, who is an advocate in Wisconsin.
She is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Center on Fathers, Families,
and Public Policy, and she represents and advocates on behalf of
clients who deal with privatized human services.
To her left is Liz Krueger. Liz, who is known to many of you as
our almost-state senator from the Upper East Side, is actually here
as the former Associate Director of the Community Food Re-
source Center, an organization that coordinates the provision of
emergency food services in New York City. Liz was one of the first
people to flag issues in the MAXIMUS contract with the City of
New York and bring the issues to public attention and debate.'
To Liz's left, as you met earlier today, is David Mastran, who is
the CEO and founder of MAXIMUS, which is the largest firm that
provides outsourced human services in the country.
Finally, there is David Riemer, who is the Director of Adminis-
tration for the City of Milwaukee. David, in the early 1990s, pro-
posed in an article in Focus magazine, which is the journal of the
Institute for Research on Poverty, the adoption of an en-
trepreneurial model of welfare administration, which first started
the thinking about privatizing and outsourcing the administration
of human services programs around the country.2
I will turn it over to Ms. Burger.
MS. BURGER: Thank you. I first want to thank everyone for
inviting me here to present the views of the 1.5 million members of
SEIU.
1. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Contracts for Cronies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at
A21; Eric Lipton, Rejecting Favoritism Claim, Court Upholds a City Welfare Contract,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at Al; Eric Lipton, State Extends Program to Enroll the
Poor in Managed Care Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2000, at B4.
2. David R. Riemer, Replacing Welfare with Work: The Case for an Employment
Maintenance Model, Focus, Winter 1994-95, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/focus /
focus.htm.
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Service Employees International Union is the largest health-care
union in North America. 3 We are the second-largest public em-
ployee union in North America.4 We are the largest union of
building service workers.5 So we see this issue from many different
perspectives.
Privatization is something that I know a little bit about person-
ally. I was a state social worker for the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, and then the president of that local. I spent twenty years
fighting privatization-as I saw it, fighting ill-advised schemes to
contract-out human services. I did so, and I continue to do so now,
with a great passion, because I believe, arid I believe evidence sup-
ports, that contracting out is bad for taxpayers, bad for service re-
cipients, and bad for the workers who spend their lives trying to
deliver services.
One of the themes of this conference is that contracting out
often comes at the expense of public accountability, and I certainly
agree. But I also want to make it very clear that contracting out
comes at the expense of workers and the people they serve, be-
cause contracting out is one of those "double whammies" of evil.
It acts to erode employment standards as well as performance
standards.
When it comes to public service and human service, the goals of
our members and of our unions are the same as those of the public
at large. We all want high standards. We want workers to have the
tools and the training required to do a good job. The public wants,
and we want, to protect fairness and equal treatment in public pro-
grams, to protect people's privacy, and to hold those responsible
accountable. Most of all, Americans want public services that they
can count on, and we want to provide that.
Workers cannot do that unless they are qualified, well-trained,
highly motivated, and fairly compensated. In the public sector, we
get those things because we bargain for and demand them through
our unions. In the public sector, as people have said, more than
forty percent of us are organized.6
3. Am. FED'N OF LABOR-CONG. INDUS. ORG., UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARN-
INGS DATA BOOK: COMPILATIONS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, at Sec-
tion IV (2000).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION AFFILIATION
OF EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY, at
tbl.3 (2001) (stating that 42% of employees in local government jobs belong to un-
ions), http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm.
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In the private sector, I believe it is hard to accomplish those
things. It is hard to attract and retain competent workers, because
less than ten percent of the private sector is unionized.7
To give you a concrete example of what the difference means, in
1999, the average hourly wage for a unionized employee was
$18.43 an hour.8 The average wage for a nonunion private-sector
worker was $14.30 an hour, and the vast majority of those workers
had little or no health insurance and virtually no pension benefits.9
For social workers, the comparison was $19.31 an hour to $15.32 an
hour.' 0
So we must ask: What happens to public sector workers who fol-
low their jobs after they have been contracted-out? Well, one
study of privatization in Chicago showed the impact to be dra-
matic." Workers who moved from their public employment to pri-
vate contractors saw their wages drop so dramatically that all of a
sudden they began to qualify for food stamps, school lunch pro-
grams for their kids, energy assistance programs, and other means
tested programs. 12
Some would say-and the Chicago experience might argue-
that money was saved by contracting out those services. But one
thing is not debatable: this practice created new costs that were
shifted to the county, to the state, and to the federal government.
That raises an accountability issue that must be of interest to this
conference. It also changes some of the calculations of the alleged
cost savings to taxpayers. Equally important is that the practice of
contracting out to lower-paying jobs is objectionable for ethical
reasons.
In reality today, there is rising support of living-wage laws across
this country because people believe that workers deserve a living
wage. 13 People do not believe that we should be saving money by
7. 9.4% of private sector workers claimed to be union members in 1999. BARRY
HIRSCH & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, UNION MEMBER-
SHIP AND EARNINGS DATABOOK: COMPILATIONS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY (2000).
8. Id. at 1 tbl.2a.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 58 tbl.8A.
11. CHI. INST. ON URB. POVERTY, DOES PRIVATIZATION PAY: A CASE STUDY OF
PRIVATIZATION IN CHICAGO-ANALYSIS OF ITS EFFECT ON WORKERS AND COST
SAVINGS ESTIMATES (1997).
12. Id. at 14.
13. See, e.g., Shawn Cox, Coalition Decries 'Poverty Wages,' Councilwoman Urges
Support for Living-Wage Rule, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 2001, at Bi; Shawn
Foster, Activists Slam Proposed Ban on 'Living Wage' Laws, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan.
29, 2001, at B4; Jen Kern, Working for a Living Wage, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR,
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contracting out to poverty-wage employers. They think it is wrong
public policy, and it is just plain wrong.
We also believe that it is objectionable on practical grounds be-
cause lower wages and less benefits attract fewer and fewer work-
ers. The current nursing shortage is an example of this. 14
Now, in the area of social services, we believe that the stakes are
especially high because of the nature of the population receiving
the services. Our union represents many workers who provide ser-
vices to children, needy families, the elderly, and the disabled.
We have witnessed the impact of contracting out not in the ab-
stract, but in the front lines. In recent years, many key social ser-
vice areas have been heavily contracted out to profit-making
companies, including services to the mentally ill and the develop-
mentally disabled. We think there is an overwhelming consensus
that the quality of care has declined-that consumers are receiving
worse care than before. There are horror stories appearing daily in
the newspapers about poor service delivery, fraud, corruption,
waste, financial mismanagement, and neglect and abuse of our cli-
ents by private contractors.15
What is particularly alarming to me is the recent emphasis on
block grants in key federal programs and the devolution of services
to lower levels of government. This increases contracting out in
the very areas that need the most protection.
There are examples every day in the newspapers. Coming down
here today, I was reading The Washington Post. There is a scandal
right now going on in Washington, D.C. with Lockheed Martin.16
It just happens to be the case of the day.
I would say also that the new Bush Administration appears
likely to support this trend, which is concerning to us, but they also
are going to expand, as we heard earlier, charitable choice. We
believe that the expansion into faith-based initiatives is dangerous.
We also know that the overwhelming majority of the public dis-
agrees with faith-based services as well. Studies have shown that
Jan. 1, 2001, at 14; Bonnie Piece, Editorial, Wage Should Support Family, "Living
Wage" Debate Rages On, POST-STANDARD SYRACUSE, Jan. 25, 2001, at A9.
14. Testimony of the American Organization of Nurse Executive before the Sub-
comm. on Aging of the Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions Comm. on the Nursing
Shortage, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Diane Anderson).
15. See, e.g., Clayton Bellamy, Lax Oversight at Home for Disabled Leads to Inju-
ries, Audit Says Review says Many Injuries were Preventable, ST. Louis DISPATCH,
Mar. 18, 2001, at Metro.
16. Petula Dvorak, DMV Bears Down on Collection Agency; Ticket Complaints
Rising; Director Wants Lockheed to Shake out Computer Bugs, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
2001, at B03.
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the public feels that having religious organizations provide publicly
funded programs leads to discrimination based on faith.17 They are
concerned about discrimination both in hiring and in the provision
of services.
Our research tells us that the public wants government to be ex-
tremely careful, to protect public accountability, and it wants to
make sure that when contracting out is done, that we make sure
that they are protected, and that their privacy is protected. 8
I think that Kerry Korpi from AFSME made a strong point:19
even when you have good managers, often they cannot provide
good services, so why do many believe those managers would do a
better job when they are monitoring private contracts? The reality
is they do not do a better job when they are monitoring private
contracts.
The International Accounting Management Association has
been tracking contracting out of government services since 1982.20
Its survey of public managers found that sixty percent of public
managers in charge of privatized contracts admit that they exer-
cised no oversight at all of the outsource contracts.2'
Today I do not want to talk only about all the evils of contracted
services and contracting out, though I think that they are many. I
want to spend a few minutes talking about the solutions.
We believe that there are solutions. SEIU has drafted the Public
Service Accountability Act,2 or "PSAA," and there are brochures
about it here that you can take when you leave.23
The Public Service Accountability Act is designed to protect tax-
payers and the users of public services by creating an objective way
to evaluate proposals for service delivery.24 This proposed legisla-
tion has seven main components.
17. Internal poll conducted by Lake, Snell, and Perry (2000) (on file with the
SEIU) [hereinafter LSP Poll].
18. Id.
19. Panel Discussion, Living with Privatization: At Work and in the Community, in
Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of
Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1397 (2001).
20. MILDRED E. WARNER & MICHAEL J. BALLARD, CORNELL UNIVERSITY TAK-
ING THE HIGH ROAD: LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING AND THE QUEST FOR
QUALITY (2000), http://www.crp.cornell.edu/restructuring/doc/reports/highroad/.
21. Id.
22. The Public Services Accountability Act, a model for state and local level legis-
lation, was drafted by SEIU in 1999, and is available at the following address: Public
Services You Can Count On, Service Employees International Union, 1313 L Street
NW, Washington, D.C. 20005.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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First, it safeguards taxpayers' dollars by demanding a detailed
cost analysis of all costs associated with contracting out.25 It also
requires a minimum savings of at least ten percent in all privatized
contracts.26
Second, it protects privacy. It prohibits contractors from selling
private information, such as social security numbers, income infor-
mation, and home addresses.
Third, it weeds out unqualified companies. Under the PSAA,
prospective contractors are required to divulge their employees'
experience and training; to divulge complaints filed against them
for violations of federal, state, or local laws. They also have to di-
vulge the political contributions of the company.28
Fourth, it requires contractors to provide access to information.
It guarantees the public will have access to all information pertain-
ing to the delivery of the services.29
Fifth, it protects whistle blowers. We believe that we need a
guarantee that public employees who disclose information about
wrongdoing of their employers are protected.3 °
Sixth, it ensures that all funds go toward public services by re-
quiring that private contractors cannot divert money to other activ-
ities, such as trying to prevent unionization or trips to other states
and other ways of trying to solicit business.3'
Seventh, it guarantees continuation of service delivery. It re-
quires that services not be disrupted and that experienced, quali-
fied workers not be penalized if a contractor changes.32
We know that these seven points are supported broadly in this
country. Again, we have done some polls. Seventy-eight percent
of Republicans when we polled them have said that they would
support legislation like this, seventy-seven percent of Democrats
would support it, and seventy-six percent of independent voters
would support it.33
In summation: SEIU has launched a national campaign. We
want to have a public-service worker/public-service client dialogue
across this country to demand public officials provide social ser-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. LSP Poll, supra note 17.
1440
SYMPOSIUM
vices, human services, and public services that we can count on in a
way that is reliable, dependable, and meets our standards.
Public employees are like everybody else. They want to work in
a successful organization, they want to do a good job, and are im-
patient to have that opportunity. That is why we have launched
this initiative.
We anticipate that as we begin this debate we will hear a lot from
business groups who will fight us on these proposals because they
know that they will not be able to compete against the public sec-
tor when they are held up against these standards.
Thank you very much.
MS. BOGGESS: First, I am going to give you a little background
about what I do and why I am here today.
I was practicing law in Chicago, on the South Side, in a very
small probate office, and my husband was in social welfare policy.
I would come home and he would show me some statute relevant
to his social policy work. He then would tell me what was happen-
ing to the population it was affecting. We questioned these statutes
because of the negative effect they had on the populations they
were designed to help. That is when. I made the decision to pursue
social welfare policy and educate people as to what these policies
really mean. However, I intended this pursuit to be a temporary
one, thinking eventually I would pursue something like English
literature.
I find myself, though, still in social welfare policy, sort of stuck
here, because what I found when I tried to explain such a statute
and how it applies to recipients of the services-I was labeled an
"advocate." I thought I was just a policy analyst. But when I
talked about human services and the people who receive human
services, I discovered that I was an advocate. So that is what I am
today, and I am going to do just that.
I work for the Center on Fathers, Families, and Public Policy,
and we are dealing a lot with child support enforcement and the
child support enforcement system. I do work with people, particu-
larly fathers, who have to utilize privatized systems to receive
services.
Early on in our work, we realized that it is poor people and not
just poor fathers-that it is poor mothers and poor children and
the services they are receiving-to whom we had to pay attention.
Today I am going to talk about privatization from the perspective
of poor people who receive human services.
14412001]
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I will tell you that individual clients do not much care whether or
not services are privatized. Now, I do not mean that to say that I
support privatization, because I do not, necessarily. I am con-
cerned about contracting out child support enforcement services
and welfare services to private companies.
In the debate about privatization versus public service provision,
we must be careful not to forget accountability. What does ac-
countability mean? I do not know if we have described or defined
it today. From my perspective, the real question is: Accountability
to do what in human services?
In a situation like trash pickup, for example, accountability is
with the state. It is about efficiency, money, and where taxpayer
dollars are going. I am resolutely not a taxpayer advocate today,
but I understand in those situations that we are concerned about
state interests.
However, in human services, accountability is accountability to
humans who need the services.
I want to tell you about three issues. I just have to give a little
background about just three places where people find themselves
in the human service provision.
One is voluntary acknowledgement of paternity. Under the new
federal welfare laws, when women go to get cash welfare benefits,
they have to disclose the name of the father of their child.3 ' The
reason that happens is because in every state-except Wisconsin,
where all federal child support is passed directly to welfare recipi-
ents-the state takes the assignment, reserves the federal child sup-
port payment, and keeps it in exchange for the mother's welfare
check.35 So what the state then turns around and does in most
34. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1994) (amended by Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000)) (providing that a noncustodial parent is in compliance with a federally funded
state welfare plan when there is a "commitment by the noncustodial parent to cooper-
ate, at the earliest possible opportunity, in the establishment of paternity of the minor
child, through voluntary acknowledgement or other procedures, and in the establish-
ment of a child support order"); 42 U.S.C. § 608 (2001) (providing mandatory mea-
sures states are required to take, including reduction of public assistance, if a parent is
noncooperative in helping to establish paternity); Margaret Campbell Haynes & Peter
S. Felicieangeli, Child Support in the Year 2000, 3 DEL. L. REV. 65, 66 (2000) (discuss-
ing how Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651, requires as a condition
to federal welfare funding, that each state establish a state child support agency to
provide a 'paternity establishment' for parents or caregivers who receive public
assistance).
35. Compare Haynes & Feliceangeli, supra note 34, at 79 (describing how, in most
states, child support payments are paid through a centralized collection unit, as re-
quired by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42
U.S.C. § 211 (1996) with Wis. STAT. § 767.29 (2000) (stating "[a]ll orders or judgments
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states is go after the father to repay this loan, which is the welfare
cash benefit. So what they are doing now is "voluntary acknowl-
edgement" -that is to say, men are just signing on the dotted line:
"I am the father, I am the father, I am the father."
There are a lot of due process implications from this practice that
I do not have time to discuss today. States have required the father
to sign when in hospitals and virtually anywhere. Fathers have
been asked to do it in community-based organizations, child sup-
port offices, and even in bathrooms, as far as I know.
But when the provision of this service, voluntary acknowledge-
ment, is provided by the public sector, someone hands a piece of
paper to the father and says: "Sign here and you will not have to go
to court." The law says that the voluntary acknowledgement pro-
cess and its implications must be explained.36 I am sure this is done
on some level. But from the clients I have spoken to, the clients
that we have represented in our office-for example, the man who
paid child support for ten years until a judge finally decided he was
not the biological father-I have learned that they do not under-
stand what is being said to them. They did not understand the im-
plications of the requirements before the voluntary
acknowledgement services were privatized, nor did they under-
stand them afterwards. The people who receive human services do
not know the difference as to voluntary acknowledgement of
paternity.
The second issue is profit. I know that is one of the things we are
concerned about. That is what one audience member was talking
about earlier regarding MAXIMUS.3" Where does the money go
and how does that happen? I think we should be concerned about
the fact that these contractor organizations receive a pot of money,
subtract whatever they spend on the people who need the services,
and the remainder is profit.
But remember, there were problems within the system even
before contracting out happened. The statutory scheme that the
government created is set up in such a way that to give welfare cash
benefits to the woman, the government must find another poor
person-usually, the father-from whom to get that money back.
providing for temporary or permanent maintenance, child support or family support
payments shall direct the payment of such sums to the department or its designee for
the use of the person for whom the same has been awarded") (emphasis added).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000).
37. Panel Discussion, Public Oversight of Public/Private Partnerships, in Sympo-
sium, Redefining the Public Sector. Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Priva-
tization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357 (2001).
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That money is never paid because the father is unable to do so.
But that system, whether the government comes to get the reim-
bursement or a private company does, is the same to the people
who receive the services. What they see is an entity trying to take
money from them, money they do not have. It does not matter to
them whether that entity is MAXIMUS, a not-for-profit organiza-
tion, or anything else.
The third issue is also one in which our clients do not see any
difference. But, before I explain this issue, let me say that we re-
present very few people in our office. We have one lawyer besides
me. I do not practice and he is a recent law school graduate. How-
ever, we do focus groups. As a policy organization, we do focus
groups by talking to women who receive welfare benefits in Wis-
consin, and the men who pay child support all over the country.
There are reports from our organization in which we have docu-
mented this information.38
The third issue is the problem of services provided by faith-based
organizations. Again, just as with privatization, I am, and think
you should be, nervous about it. Being involved in the so-called
fatherhood movement, I have gone to community-based organiza-
tions and talked to people who would provide these services-the
people who would be sliding the voluntary acknowledgment from
across the table to fathers for their signatures. One of the things
required by many of the statutes granting money to groups that
help fathers find jobs, is that fathers sign a voluntary acknowledg-
ment with no attorney present. A man could say, "No, I will do it
later, wait until I go to court, wait until there are people around
who can tell me what is going on." But if someone is handing out a
job to you, you sign. Many sign without the understanding that
under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act, the voluntary acknowledgement has the full force and
effect of law sixty days after it is signed.39 Once the sixty days
passes, it cannot be voided or changed by anybody except a court,
38. CTR. ON FATHERS, FAM. & PUB. POL'Y & NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., REACH-
ING COMMON GROUND, FAMILY TIES: IMPROVING PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES FOR Low INCOME MOTHERS, FATHERS, AND CHIL-
DREN 9-11 (2000) (addressing the setting and modification of child support awards,
child support enforcement, and custody and visitation for low-income families), avail-
able at http://www.cffpp.org/commonground.prf; MARGUERITE ROULET, CTR ON FA-
THERS, FAM. & PUB. POL'Y, NEGOTIATING THE CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM: REPORT
FROM A DISCUSSION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE, (1998-99) (providing discussions with
fathers and case managers on their experiences in the child support system), http:I/
www.cffpp.org/publications/negotiatingthechildsupport-system.htm.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2001).
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without proof of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact.4° I have yet to
meet a poor father who has had an attorney, has read that statute,
or who knows what fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
constitutes.
We should be concerned about "fatherhood groups" and faith-
based organizations that do this work, but we also should be con-
cerned for the men affected by a 1993 law. 41 This law says that all
maternity hospitals with a certain number of births every year must
ask the woman-as she is lying in the hospital bed-the identity of
her baby's father.42 If the man is present, he signs, she signs, and
then we have an acknowledgement allowing the child support en-
forcement office or the private corporation to pursue the father for
money.
So whether the man signs while at the hospital, whether they go
to the child support enforcement office, whether they go to the
human services place, wherever they go to get this service, there is
that piece of paper that is slid across the desk accompanied by a
conversation about marriage and staying together. I am not sure
how this differs from the faith-based organization that says "you
should get married." The welfare reform law begins, in effect, by
saying "we want everybody to get married. '4 3 I am not sure how
that differs from the perspective of the people who receive the
services.
Privatization is an important issue and we need to talk about it in
all the ways that I have heard people talk about it today. We need
to find out if it is efficient. The taxpayer advocate needs to be wor-
ried about how money is spent, among other things. I am unde-
cided about privatization, but it is critical that it we discuss it.
Let us go back to what somebody said in the second panel today.
Accountability for what, and is it being done so great now? 44
Whether or not we decide to have privatization cannot be based on
the current allocation of most service provisions to the public sec-
tor. This decision cannot be based on the public provision of these
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 Note (1996) (stating that "(1) [m]arriage is the foundation
of a successful society. (2) Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society
which promotes the interests of children. (3) Promotion of responsible fatherhood
and motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and the well-being of
children").
44. Panel Discussion, supra note 37.
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services as some kind of goal, because if it is, we are going back-
ward or downward.
Thank you.
MS. KRUEGER: Hi. I will be the taxpayers' advocate today,
even though I actually have spent twenty years as an advocate for
the poor. Further, I recently ran for elected office because of what
I believe is the bottom line in this context of practicality and priva-
tization: I do not think we know what we are doing when we are
contracting out and privatizing. I do not think the government ac-
tually knows its role. I also think the job it is doing is pretty bad
and, as a result, bad things are happening to poor people and bad
things are happening with our taxpayer dollars.
Privatization does not mean one thing. The panel before us
clearly exemplified that you can talk about so many different issues
when discussing privatization. 5
Privatization, of course, is not, technically, that new in human
services. For the last century, states have purchased services from
not-for-profit and religious organizations, although not through a
charitable choice model until the mid 1990s.
I am going to stick to what I think are the real problems. We fail
to do our job in evaluating: first, whether the service should be
funded by government at all; second, if so, whether there should be
privatization of that specific service; and third, after the privatiza-
tion, whether we actually are measuring what we ought to be, in
terms of process or outcomes, in order to hold private contractors
accountable. I think that Anna Burger's examples of the questions
that must be answered in doing those evaluations are exactly
right.46
As someone who, in my previous job, not only took government
contracts but also advocated for better delivery of human services
to poor New Yorkers, and as someone who has been very critical of
this mayoral administration's policies for contracting out and priva-
tizing services, I am concerned that we fail to understand the ques-
tions regarding accountability.
Frankly, in New York City we do not have a model through
which anyone outside the administrative agency making some spe-
cific privatization decision can ask the question: "What are we con-
tracting for and is it a good use of our money? Is it something we
need?" The City of New York is spending an enormous amount of
45. Panel Discussion, supra note 19.
46. See Remarks of Anna Burger, supra this Panel Discussion.
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money in contracts that I would argue are not a good use of our tax
dollars.
Privatization is especially tricky in human services. It is more
complicated than Jacquelyn's example of waste management.47 Al-
though New Yorkers know that even waste management contracts
have not proved to be a simple process, and it is much less compli-
cated to pick up and move garbage than it is to deal with the com-
plexities of human services.
One of the examples that I like to use is that a few years ago the
City of New York and many states and localities around the coun-
try started to use finger imaging of poor people applying for gov-
ernment benefits.48 I will argue that we knew finger imaging was
unnecessary as a new mechanism of human service at the time we
entered into those contracts, but that a group of for-profit compa-
nies in the digital information and identity business-primarily for
defense contracts-wanted to develop new markets. By focusing
public attention on welfare fraud, they were able to create a new
market for products they already had in their inventory.
Governments all over the country went along and started spend-
ing tens of millions of dollars per locality or per county to put in
finger imaging equipment. I do not know whether this discussion is
still going on out there, but at the time that governments were do-
ing finger imaging, they were talking about the inferior model of
combating fraud through finger imaging-because finger image
fraud was possible-and that they needed to move to retina
scanning.
Well, the punch line is that before anybody actually let those
contracts, there already had been some research done showing that
you do not save any money for taxpayers by doing finger imaging.
In fact, although there are many ways to commit welfare fraud just
as there are many ways to rip off any government program that has
ever existed, recipients pretending to be multiple people to get
those benefits several times per month does not account for a sig-
nificant percentage of the losses due to fraud. I would argue that
truly talented criminals follow that old rule: you rob banks "be-
cause that is where the money is." Talented criminals do not waste
their time getting $137 twice a month in Home Relief here in New
York City.
47. See Remarks of Jacquelyn Boggess, supra this Panel Discussion.
48. E.g., Welfare Policy-Fraud Prevention-New York Requires Finger Imaging
for Welfare Recipients, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1168 (1996).
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We knew all that before we made the contracts, but were sold a
bill of goods by people who, to give them credit, were just repre-
senting companies looking at their bottom line and marketing their
products.
But government bought the product without having any mecha-
nism for evaluating who should run the program-the SEIU or a
private company or the City of New York. And, should we be buy-
ing it at all? Our government contracts all the time without an-
swering these preliminary questions establishing proper evaluation
mechanisms.
I will use New York City as my example of how government
does this, because it is my home base, and I am most familiar with
it. We were going to contract with a company called "HANEC"
[Hellenic American Neighborhood Action Committee] several
years ago. It was sort of the first contracting scandal of the Giu-
liani Administration and New Yorkers will remember it. It got
canceled, frankly, because of political patronage stories coming out
about how that company received the contract.49
At the time, I was arguing, "Yes, patronage is bad, but did any-
body read the contract?" The administration wants to use govern-
ment money to hire private companies to close people's cases and
they will get paid per every case they close. The evaluation tool is
not whether they provided a human service, not whether they
moved people out of poverty-which I think should be the real
question in measuring outcomes in welfare reform-but just
whether cases were closed.
I asked all over in the structure of New York City government
and New York State government about the outside review process
for determining whether that is a good scope of service to be con-
tracted out.
The other argument against contracting for such services is that
those are functions that should be the responsibility of social ser-
vice employees. I actually agree with that-it should be social ser-
vice employees who work for the City who make the
determination.
In the HANEC case there was no mechanism for the public to
question the administration about whether we should be doing a
contract for that scope of service, or whether the potential provider
had given major support to the mayor's campaign.
49. Contractor Cries Foul to U.S. Sup. Ct. Over De Facto Debarment. Hellenic
American Neighborhood Action Committee v. City of New York, ANDREWS GOV'T
CONTRACT LITIG. REP. 4, June 5, 1997.
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These problems go further than that. In the City of New York,
we do this sort of contracting of hundreds of millions of dollars
repeatedly. Still, we do not even ask for what are we contracting.
In addition, I strongly believe government does not know how to
write contracts that actually meet their privatization goals-even
once we decide whether a service should be contracted-out.
Should it be done by government? Is this something our taxpayer
dollars should be used for? We still are clueless about how to enter
into a contract with a large corporation on an even playing field.
I will use as an example the structure for EBT, Electronic Bene-
fit Transfer, payments in the State of New York. New York State
contracted-out-and I will not blame New York too much, because
every other state is contracting with the same company-to Ci-
tigroup to provide the distribution of basically all cash assistance
and other income support benefits from government to people
through an ATM system.50 Many advocates in the State of New
York had real concerns about how this contract was going forward,
why suddenly the savings disappeared for government. Originally
the state said the people would save $250 million through move-
ment to EBT, and now it is saying, "Well, maybe we will not save
anything."
A lot of us were very concerned that, as new clauses in the con-
tract imposed costs, Citigroup decided to charge poor people for
the services. Now the vast majority of people who go to ATMs to
get their public assistance benefits in New York are paying $1.00 to
$1.50 per transaction at the ATM just to get their cash assistance.51
This is not because Citigroup to some degree violated their con-
tract, but because the State of New York did not have a clue how
to negotiate a good contract for billions of dollars.
This was part of a seven-state, seven-year regional contract. I
think it is a $3 billion contract. Some of us went to another govern-
ment agency, the New York State Banking Department, and asked
them if Citigroup was breaking the rules of the contract. They said,
"No. The contract is so bad." When told the Department of Social
Services wrote the contract, their reply was: "Well, they do not
know anything about contracting with a financial institution. Why
did they do it this way?" Well, "why" is a great question. There
50. Editorial, Soaking the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, at A24. See generally
David J. Kennedy, Due Process in A Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
231 (1998) (discussing EBT system of cash assistance programs).
51. Editorial, Soaking the Poor, supra note 50 (discussing fees charged with certain
withdrawals).
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were many layers of government-federal, state, and local-in-
volved in that process.
Poor people are not the only ones to get ripped off. Bad con-
tracting rips off all taxpayers. I would argue that EBT is a good
example of a service appropriate for privatization, but in this in-
stance it was executed poorly.
We also have no mechanism, I believe, for truly evaluating im-
plementation and oversight of contracting for human services.
That gets very complicated in the world of welfare benefit time
limits, federal welfare rules, and for-profit motives for contracting
versus not-for-profit, mission-driven motives, and religious
motives.
My biggest worry in contracting and privatizing in human ser-
vices today is the reality of the profit motive. Again, I refer to my
finger-imaging example. I missed this morning's panel, but appar-
ently some issues regarding MAXIMUS corporation already
arose,52 and the gentleman from MAXIMUS is here. MAXIMUS
was just one of the companies involved in the City of New York's
welfare-to-work contracting process. This process was atrocious
for a variety of reasons, including that the contracting rules were
not followed. I would argue we have not even started to lay down
the rules we should have for making these decisions.
My real concern, big picture, on the profit motive in contracting
out human services is that you cannot look at it like a nice econom-
ics book example of how competitive competition will drive down
costs and get you better delivery of services. It is human services,
and, therefore, it is very complex. It is very difficult to get into the
business, so there are limitations on who can enter and compete in
the "market."
My biggest reason for concern about for-profits in the human
services world is the worry that this is all one giant dot-com story
waiting to happen. A bunch of companies emerged in the human
services market, and made IPOs, and made a lot of money. I ap-
plaud the head of MAXIMUS for coming here today. You earned
$18 million when MAXIMUS went public a couple of years ago.
You can afford not to spend your day sitting here with all of us.
And yet, what happens when these companies fold and disap-
pear, as so many of the dot-coms suddenly have this year? We in-
vested government money in the delivery of services to poor
Americans. If the company with the contract to deliver services
52. Panel Discussion, supra note 37.
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does not complete the assignment or does not complete the assign-
ment well, it may or may not have made all its profits on the IPO
and stock options anyway. Its profits are irrelevant of the actual
contract arrangements, but taxpayers' money has come and gone.
Poor people may or may not have had the opportunity to get the
services they needed. Their lives can be destroyed in the process.
And, of course, time limits on welfare benefits mean they do not
get another chance to get the help they need.
I think there is something fundamentally wrong with having a for
profit model for delivery of human services. Companies decide to
stop unprofitable ventures. However, you still have to deliver the
human services. What happens if there is no infrastructure left be-
cause you contracted out: the company either makes money and
leaves the market, or does not make money and leaves, or violates
the rules and is asked by government to leave. There is no infra-
structure in place to continue to deliver those services. And again,
the money, time, and resources that should have been available to
help people no longer exist.
I think that we are in a spiral where we have not seen the end of
the story yet, but we have seen enough of it to know that we should
be very, very wary of the fact that billions of dollars in the City's
budget are contracted out. I do not know the exact numbers or
what percentage of this is for human services, but it is billions for
human services. Multiply that dollar amount to get the figure on a
national level.
Again, I would argue, we have to go back to scratch. Do we
know what we actually are contracting for and why? Do we know
how to do it? Do we know how to measure the implementation
and the outcome and to fix things mid-stream? I, unfortunately, do
not think we have the answers to any of those questions, and yet
we are doing it all, and for human services purposes. Sadly, low-
income Americans are the ones who pay the price for our not hav-
ing done our homework.
Thank you.
DR. MASTRAN: I am really glad I came.
One of the reasons I am here is because there are a lot of mis-
perceptions about for-profit companies and contracting for the
provision of human services. I hope that perhaps I can at least
provide a perspective to you that you can consider. I also am pre-
pared, if any of the professors here or other interested groups want
it, to make our data available. I will be glad to talk to them in our
Reston, Virginia facility. The General Accounting Office is doing a
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study on our projects, and we like that. We are open to any investi-
gation. We support opening up the process so people can under-
stand what is happening.
Why is this outsourcing going on? I will tell you. Because gov-
ernment managers want to do it, and they want to do it for a couple
of reasons.
One reason is that they are very frustrated with the performance
that is occurring in their programs. I am speaking from my knowl-
edge base. I am not speaking for prison industries or other services
I do not know about. I am talking about human services, health
and human services. The government managers want perform-
ance, and when they get frustrated and they cannot get it from the
public sector, they look to alternatives; and, inevitably, when they
are completely frustrated, they look to contracting it out.
For example, in Tennessee, the District Attorney's Office is re-
sponsible for administering the child support collection.53 Well, the
District Attorney prioritizes child support as the lowest case type
on their hands. The District Attorneys would rather chase murder-
ers and burglars, so sometimes the performance of this service suf-
fered in Tennessee. So the state started contracting it out.
Government managers also contract out because there are new
programs that they do not know how to run. When managed care
came along, government did not even have employees in managed
care, or any systems for managed care. They brought in a private
contractor and said, "We want you to do the system and we want
you to run this program for us." And, believe it or not, most of our
business really does come from new programs.
When we take over an existing troubled program, in every case
we have hired the employees that previously worked in that pro-
gram. And in every case we have provided a better environment
for those employees, one that had up-to-date computer systems,
one that provided training, one that had top management, one that
had a nice-looking facility, one where they were rewarded for their
performance, one where they felt better about what they were do-
ing. In all our surveys, they are happy employees.
At first, when we acquired former government employees we
thought that perhaps they would be the kind that did not like to
work, but that is not true at all. They are as good workers as any-
body else. They are just put in a different environment.
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-602 (2000) (designating the office of the district at-
torney general as the agency participating in the child support collection program as
provided by federal law).
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So let me assure you that much good is happening to poor peo-
ple out there as a result of privatization.
The big topic here today is accountability. I agree that govern-
ment does not know how to contract well in some areas of human
services, though in some areas of human services it does. In order
to have a good contract, you have to know what you want, you
have to be able to define it, you have to be able to measure it, and
somebody has to be able to achieve it. So you need to have those
ingredients in place, and there is a lot of learning that has to take
place on the part of government contractors.
But we operate under standards, believe me. We have standards
that are imposed on us in some jurisdictions that are far more se-
vere than any government ever took on for itself, and we are ac-
countable to meet those standards.
In some places, there is not intensive monitoring, that is true, but
in some places, I think there are too many. For example, in one of
our California offices, we have twenty-three government monitors
there all the time.
We are accountable because we can be fired. Every contract I
have signed has a thirty- or sixty-day cancellation clause for the
convenience of the government. If we are not doing our job, we
are out of there. That is not true in the government. That is why
government managers get more response from the private sector-
we can be penalized financially if we do not perform.
Now, this can be good and bad. We had a contract that had a set
of eight performance standards, which we met perfectly. Two years
later that jurisdiction did an evaluation and decided to replace
MAXIMUS saying that we did not do what they wanted. I was
given two performance standards that I had never seen before, and
that were not even in our contract. They were good standards, but
it was not what they contracted for us to do. We told them if they
were put in our contract, we would follow them. So I think there
also is a responsibility on the part of government to make its needs
and requirements clear.
And I agree-we all support good government and happy em-
ployees, but this is a learning process. Many of these programs fail
because it is the first time something like it has ever been done,
and everybody learns from it.
In terms of accountability, I defy any organization to have gone
through as much public scrutiny as MAXIMUS or as many investi-
gations as MAXIMUS. We are viewed through a microscope, we
are always looked at, and we have to withstand that, we have to
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stand up to that. I say if you do not hold us to higher standards and
we cannot stand up to it, then we should not be providing services.
That is why you should privatize-why you should outsource-be-
cause you can hold an organization to a higher standard based
upon performance and ethics.
When we took over the welfare program, one of the innovations
I introduced, which was unheard of, is to give feedback forms to
the recipients. We asked, "What do you think about how we
treated you?" No government that I know had ever done that
before.
We had a standard, which was not required by our contract, but
every welfare recipient would be interviewed within fifteen min-
utes of coming to our offices. They logged the time when they
came in, and when the case manager picked them up. Sometimes
our own internal standards are higher than what a contract imposes
on us. In fact, many times states and countries have learned from
our own internal standards and have rewritten contracts to incor-
porate those standards.
We are subject to public hearings like anybody else. So we are
accountable. We are accountable because we can be fired, we are
accountable for specific standards, we are exposed to extreme scru-
tiny, we go to public hearings. If you can define what you want and
we agree to do it, then we can be held accountable. I think there is
more accountability in the private sector.
The frustration government managers have is that they cannot
hold their own public bureaucracy accountable. They do not have
any choices. Often, jurisdictions use the threat of privatization if
government managers fail. Some jurisdictions actually have what
they call a managed competition where they will bring in a com-
pany, let's say MAXIMUS, to compete simultaneously with the
regular government employees. This is going on right now in
California.54
This is a healthy thing, because not only does MAXIMUS per-
form well, but the government does, too. Their performance im-
proves. Everybody gets better at service delivery. Everybody
wins.
So there are a lot of good reasons for privatization.
One of the questions that arises is: What can be privatized?
Since this is a law school, I thought I would tell you something that
54. E.g., Jerry Taylor, Prediction: California Power Deregulation will be a Fiasco: If
Politicians had Heeded this 1996 Warning, California Wouldn't be in the Dark Today,
NAT'L POST, Jan. 19, 2001, at C19.
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I have not heard yet today. You talk about discretionary decision
making-that cannot be privatized. I have been in two lawsuits
over it. What is privatized is ministerial work that has policies and
procedures that can be well defined. You cannot privatize a policy-
making function. That is the role of government.
You can privatize a series of procedures, policies that have to be
carried out. However, even that is confusing. We have heard the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 mentioned. That Welfare Reform
Act says, although not explicitly, that a private company can deter-
mine the eligibility of a person for welfare, but cannot determine
the eligibility of someone for Medicaid or Food Stamps, which are
almost exactly the same thing. We can determine the eligibility for
the child health insurance program, which is a by-product of deter-
mining eligibility for Medicaid. So in terms of the ethical question,
if we can determine eligibility for welfare, certainly we can deter-
mine eligibility for another component.56
I also would like to talk about the profit motive because I think
that is an extremely important issue and has to be addressed. The
MAXIMUS mission is "Helping Government Serve the People."
That is why we were founded. That is what we do. Underlying that
mission is a philosophy with three tenets.
The first tenet is quality. We must do a quality job for the ser-
vice recipient. Is it measured by the client? Is it measured by the
recipient in terms of an outcome for that recipient? If we cannot
do a quality job, we are getting out of the business of providing
that service, because you cannot survive if your primary motive in
this business is profit. You will be exposed, and you will fail. If
you are of any intelligence, you have to understand that to have a
long-term life here, you have to focus on quality-you must main-
tain a focus on quality and not on profitability.
The second tenet is profitability. Once we are satisfied that we
are serving these people and we are doing a quality job, then we
will try to earn our profit. Our profit comes not at the expense of
anybody, but from our efficiencies.
The third tenet is growth. If we cannot do a quality job and we
cannot make a profit, we will not do any more of this. We will go
somewhere else and find something else to do through which we
can add value to society.
So our company follows those tenets.
55. See Remarks of Jacquelyn Boggess, supra this Panel Discussion.
56. Block Grants to States for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 42
U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
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In closing, I would like to share with you an example from a
contract we had with the State of Connecticut about three years
ago. Connecticut had a decentralized child care system, in which
workers throughout the state determined families' eligibility for
child care and paid providers.57 It was not working. There was a
thirty percent error rate. The service was bad. Someone else-we
do not lobby for this stuff-some brave government manager, said,
"Well, why don't we try to see if the private sector can do this?"
They put out a request for proposals ("RFP") and said, "Let's con-
solidate this in one place, in Hartford. Let's do it by telephone and
by mail, and see if we can be more efficient." Their RFP said it
would take fifty-two people to do the job fielding 1000 phone calls
a day. It would function without face-to-face contact.
This was the first time childcare administration had been out-
sourced anywhere in the nation on this level. MAXIMUS bid sev-
enty-two people because we felt that Connecticut had
underestimated the number of staff necessary to do the job.
When the conversion to service delivery by MAXIMUS took
place, a virtual meltdown resulted. We were getting 5000 phone
calls daily, and the number of people we had was far too small to
handle that program. The press was screaming, "Here comes an-
other private company screwing up this thing." The state said, "We
should have known better," and began threatening to terminate
our contract and to fire us.
It was bedlam, and the service recipients were getting hurt.
Providers were not getting paid. Women who were off welfare and
who were holding jobs could not stay in them because they were
not being provided with child care. It was a bad situation.
So I said, "There is only one way this is going to get solved. We
are going to just go in there and spend all the money we have to
spend until it is fixed." I personally went to Connecticut for five
months. We had 170 people on that job-from their RFP's stated
fifty-two to 170-before I got the situation under control.
After it was under control, I went to the state and I said: "Here
is what it takes. If you do not believe it, take some of these people
away." We negotiated an equitable settlement where we bore half
the risk and the state bore half the risk.
This is where quality comes first. We must deliver the service
first.
57. Jonathan Rabinovitz, In Connecticut a Privately Run Welfare Program Sinks
into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at B2.
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So that is how you succeed in this business. You do quality first,
profits come second, and then if you are good at those, then you
can grow.
Thank you.
MR. RIEMER: One of the most distinguished graduates of my
law school, Harvard Law School, was Oliver Wendell Holmes. I
believe he once said, "the life of the law is not logic, but experi-
ence." This was sort of a heretical thing to say at a school whose
governing spirit was Christopher Columbus Langdell,58 who seems
to have had no real experience in the legal world but a strong love
for abstract logic. But Holmes was of the old school and he felt
that experience was important.
The reason I am here, I guess, is not to be illogical, but to speak
out of the experience I have had as the administrator across a
broad range of governmental programs.
This morning, as I prepared for speaking today, I was thinking
about where I have worked. Many of the programs in which I have
been involved have ranged all across the board. In some cases,
they are split between traditional public administration, in which
rules are set, a framework is established, government employees
cover the job out; and/or programs in which government acts as a
purchaser and enters into privatization relationships.
There is also a second kind of category of privatization that, to
me, somewhat stands apart, and with which I also have been heav-
ily involved. This category of privatization includes programs like
Medicaid or school choice or Food Stamps-in which government
does not so much contract directly with a private vendor, as it em-
powers the individual service recipient with purchasing power to
obtain a service from a regulated marketplace. Such voucher pro-
grams are similar to traditional privatization, but have some dis-
tinct characteristics.
The City of Milwaukee has a police department. Police officers
are public employees, but the cars they drive, and the guns and
bullets that they use, are purchased through contracts with private
vendors. We have fire fighters, but we buy fire engines from the
private market. The city has a bunch of engineers, but we also con-
tract for private engineering services, and the road construction
that the engineering ultimately leads to is typically done by private
58. Christopher Columbus-Langdell was the dean of Harvard Law School from
1870-1895. He introduced the method of teaching case law to legal education. ENCY-
CLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, http://www.brittannica.comseo/c/christopher-columbus-
langdell.
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vendors, as is the reconstruction. We have sanitation workers that
plow the streets when it snows, which it does pretty often in Mil-
waukee, and clean the streets in general and pick up the garbage
and, from my point of view, are probably the most important pub-
lic health workers in Milwaukee. But we also hire private vendors
to do specialized sanitation, special pickups, to kind of "plow the
corners," areas that the regular sanitation workers do not do. We
have parking checkers, but we also have a contract with Lockheed
to manage the parking checker system. In my department, we have
programmers and computer people, but we also contract, on a
case-by-case basis, with private organizations to do some of that
work.
Shifting to the human services area, which I do not directly ad-
minister, but I have been involved in, the City of Milwaukee has
public health nurses and officials, but the biggest part of health
care in the Milwaukee area is delivered through the Medicaid Pro-
gram.5 9 Healthy Start6° is another SCHIP program managed by
HMOs, private organizations, which, in turn, basically pay private
doctors and private hospitals. The last public hospital in Milwau-
kee was closed down by the county, not the city, a couple of years
ago.
County employees enroll people in Medicaid and Healthy Start,
SCHIP and Food Stamps, but private agencies, W-2 agencies-
MAXIMUS is among them, as well as Goodwill and the YWCA-
do the enrollment and provide the service for other parts of that
system.
We have public schools, but we also have private schools under
contract to the public schools, charter schools under contract to
both the public schools and the city and the university, and also
"choice" schools. 61
We have a Food Stamp program, which obviously is a govern-
ment program. Our experience with EBT has been very positive.62
I actually just asked the welfare advocates from Milwaukee about
it the other day, and they said that, unlike some of the rural coun-
ties where it did not go so well, Milwaukee learned from their les-
sons and we transferred 60,000 people from government checks to
59. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 49.45 (1997) (discussing provision of health care to eligible
persons).
60. SCHIP is the acronym for "State Children's Health Insurance Program." Id.
61. Steven Walters, Choice Funding Splits Capitol, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr.
12, 2001, at 1B (describing the current system in Milwaukee and summarizing the
debate regarding possible reformations by the state legislature).
62. But see Remarks of Liz Krueger, infra this Panel Discussion.
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EBT cards for Food Stamps with hardly a ripple. So at least there
it went pretty well.
I have seen a lot of forms of both public and private programs. I
have seen completely public programs. I have seen completely
privatized programs in which government contracts out and is de-
centralized in the private sector. Beyond that, I have seen all kinds
of mixes and matches. I can say without fear of contradiction that
it is almost impossible to come up with a single conclusion about
the effectiveness of one approach versus the other.
We are at a law school, so I suppose it is sort of de rigueur to say
"it depends"-isn't that the answer to every essay you ever had in
law school, "it depends on the facts?"
But it truly does depend on the facts. It particularly depends on
the management. I want to make it clear that to the extent any-
thing I say suggests or implies a criticism of traditionally adminis-
tered programs, the criticism is fundamentally no different than the
criticisms of privatized programs that have not succeeded. The
problem lies almost overwhelmingly with management.
Every now and then, you get a rogue employee in the govern-
ment-for example, a police officer who goes off the deep end and
murders somebody. Obviously, New York and every other city
have seen instances of that. We had that in Milwaukee. Most cities
have that.
However, also in the private sector, every private firm has em-
ployees who do illegal things and stupid things. And, sure enough,
there are trial lawyers out there who remind them of that and bring
multimillion-dollar judgments for sexual harassment or
discrimination.
However, the main reason things go wrong is because of
management.
I would like to suggest in talking about the distinction between
public administration and privatization, although we often see
them as quite distinct and often get exercised by the differences
between the two, that at a certain fundamental level, they are not
as far apart as we think.
First of all, as several speakers have said, most of the main deci-
sions that are made are made by government. 63 Government offi-
cials make decisions about whether to deliver a service in the first
place, what kind of service it should be, when it starts, and when it
stops. And then, as Jacquelyn said, at the receiver end, people
63. See Remarks of Jacquelyn Boggess, supra this Panel Discussion.
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often do not know the difference. People have no clue many times
as to whether the service delivery agent is a government employee,
a private employee, or anything in between.64
When you look analytically at a government service and a pri-
vate service, there really are aspects of them that are fundamen-
tally the same. They both involve government playing a role and
private decision-making.
Obviously, in traditional government service, the government
sets the framework and sets the rules, but after the framework and
the rules are set, individuals exercise a huge amount of discretion.
Any person who ever has followed a DA in any county knows that
DAs are different-the same law, same legal structure, but there is
wide discretion about prosecution for drugs, about attitudes about
sentencing.
The whole debate about Attorney General John Ashcroft was a
debate, in essence, about privatization within the Justice Depart-
ment.65 He says, "I am going to follow the rules and settled law
will be enforced." So why doesn't everybody just pack their bags
and go home? What is the issue? Because we all know that the
Attorney General of the United States has a huge amount of pri-
vate decision-making discretion. That is why the groups that sup-
port reproductive rights and other groups are deeply concerned
about him as Attorney General, and why groups on the pro-life
side are deeply supportive of him. It is precisely because he will,
indeed, exercise a lot of discretion. Privatization by another name.
You shift over to privatization-obviously you've got a nongov-
ernmental set of organizations and employees doing the work and
making independent decisions, but they are subject to a huge
amount of governmental structure. Private organizations are
chartered. They have corporate status. In theory, their corporate
status can be removed. They are subject to laws of contract, laws
of property, limited liability, laws that govern their structure. A
massive array of laws protecting workers, protecting consumers,
protecting investors, surround what they do. So there is this gen-
eral overarching legal framework.
Then there is the specific contract itself. That contract does not
let them do anything they want. They have to comply with the
contract.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Senate Confirms Ashcroft as Attorney General, 58-42,
Closing a Five-Week Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al (summarizing the debate
over President Bush's appointment of John Ashcroft as Attorney General).
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So it seems to me that what we have is two blended or mixed
systems that have much of the same characteristics, but we need to
understand the differences better.
To me, the more fundamental difference between the two of
them is that traditional administrative structures focus on the dis-
cretion not of the hiring of the person, but the discretion after the
person is hired to deliver the service. Once the bureaucrat or offi-
cial is in place, what decisions do they make, and are those deci-
sions made fairly and not arbitrarily.
Whereas on the privatized side, the focus is on primarily two de-
cisions: one is which private person do we pick. A fair amount of
the discretion lies in the choice of vendor. The second is the discre-
tion about whether they complied with the performance
requirement.
I want to finish by talking about a couple of things.
First of all, I do think that there are some aspects of the nature of
the business to be carried out, whether it is cleaning the streets or
whether it is something else, that tend to steer decisions toward
either traditional government administrative structures as the best
result, all else being equal, versus other factors that tend to steer
toward privatization decisions. This is what John Donahue's book
is about.66
I do think that there are these criteria: Is the task simple or is it
complicated? Can we measure the outcome or not? Is absolute
uniformity important to us or can we tolerate a wide range of dis-
cretion? You can go down a checklist and make judgments about
which way to go.
But even with that, you often can take any one of the things that
might be a little more susceptible to government administration,
privatize it, and still do it well, and vice versa.
In the end, I think what is of greatest importance is leadership
and outcomes. Probably far more important than any of this is
having good managers, good leaders, people who know what they
are trying to do, who have an internal sense of what is important.
If you do not have that, you are going to fail, no matter how the
work is done.
One thing that I think has come out over and over again from
people who support privatization, people who are opposed to it
and people who are undecided about it, is the importance of out-
comes. If you do not have clear outcomes, if you cannot measure
66. JOHN DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE
MEANS (1989); see also Panel Discussion, supra note 37.
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the results, if you do not have a mechanism for translating the dol-
lars into the outcomes, or have a structure in place, service delivery
is not going to work. Although I do not think a publicly adminis-
tered system will be a terribly successful system, a privatized sys-
tem will be a less effective system.
On the other hand, if you have clear outcomes, if you can mea-
sure them, if you can link dollars to performance that clearly reso-
nates with the outcomes, if you can inject risk that is related to the
outcomes, you often can produce very good results with a private
contract that are perhaps better than you can get in some other
way.
I think that this, to me, is the biggest area where we fail. I think
a lot of the public administrators do not understand how to do this.
They were not trained to think about outcomes or to link dollars to
outcomes. They did not learn about it in law school, they did not
learn about it in public administration school, they did not learn
about it on the job. They often were raised within a culture, within
a bureaucracy, that perhaps did not have a habit of dealing with
outcomes and linking dollars to outcomes, so that when they try to
do it, they are lost at sea.
A lot of the organizations that do privatization best are ones that
have just been doing it a long time and have people who know how
to do it.
The street that I walked on to get over here, the sidewalk, was
probably built by a private contractor; not by City of New York
employees, I assume, but by a private firm contracted with by the
City of New York. I assume that is how you do it here. That street
was probably built within the price and met specifications. But
those people were in the business of doing that year after year.
We must learn to develop a cadre of lawyers and public adminis-
trators who know how to do this and know how to do it right. Un-
til we get people who are experienced in doing this, going back to
Holmes's point, we can have all the talk at all the forums about the
theories, criteria, and standards, but unless we get people in place
who know how to do this we are never going to succeed with either
direct administration or privatization.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR DILLER: Before we turn it over for questions,
because there was such a diversity of views on the panel, I would
just ask if anyone wants to respond or comment on anything that
has been said.
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MS. BURGER: I actually have a question, regarding the MAX-
IMUS contract with the State of Connecticut. You stated that
when you had all the disasters in Connecticut that you split the cost
with the State of Connecticut. What was the original value of the
contract and what was the increased cost to the State of Connecti-
cut? And how is the program operating now?
DR. MASTRAN: Let me just say that when we bid on that con-
tract and increased the cost by proposing to hire seventy-two and
not fifty-two people, the increased cost was still below the bid of
the next competitor. The increase did not take them higher than
the next company that we competed against.
MS. BURGER: So your original cost was $12.4 million and the
actual cost went up by fifty percent in the next contract, and state
workers had to move in to help resolve the situation.
DR. MASTRAN: That is not true. I know that is what the news-
papers say, but that was not true.
In terms of how are we being received now, we have all kinds of
letters from the providers that ask to bring MAXIMUS back. I
would be glad to make those letters available to you.
MS. BURGER: What would be interesting would be to figure
out how we have full accountability, so we can actually see what is
true based on what the company says what the newspapers say, and
what the State of Connecticut says. That way, we could actually
evaluate whether services are being provided, whether the costs
are real, and whether they are being efficient, in terms of
accountability.
DR. MASTRAN: I think that is fair. I do not have a problem
with that.
MS. BURGER: So maybe you could look at our brochure and
see if you support it.
DR. MASTRAN: Sure. I will tell you that Connecticut recon-
tracted with us even though they had an option not to recontract.
One other thing I want to mention is that government does have
to know how to do this. Sometimes cost is a factor, although fre-
quently it is not. Mostly it is a factor of effectiveness-are we re-
ally delivering services? In fact, in some of our contracts the
government has been so happy with the delivery, they actually in-
creased the size of our contracts.
But if the government goes with a low-cost bidder, a company
that does not have a track record and has not been around a long
time, or is an "irresponsible" contractor, you are going to have
problems.
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So this process requires an extra step-that is, be able to con-
tract effectively, which is not easy to learn-but if you can take
that extra step, if you can learn that extra step, there are benefits at
the end of it.
PROFESSOR DILLER: Any questions from the audience?
QUESTION: I have a question for Dr. Mastran. You stated that
your goals were quality, profitability, and growth. In some govern-
ment services, particularly human services, quality and profitability
may not be compatible goals. There may be clients who need more
service than it is profitable to deliver to them-may need more job
training, may have more problems-and so sometimes choices
need to be made about how much service you are going to deliver
to them.
DR. MASTRAN: We do not do that.
QUESTIONER: The quality versus profitability choice. I am
just wondering-so you resolve that choice in favor of quality?
DR. MASTRAN: Our first requirement is quality. I think there
were newspaper articles about us, in fact, before this other stuff hit,
about how our case managers put more and more time into making
sure that they delivered quality services.67 So that is our premise,
deliver quality first.
QUESTIONER: Okay. I am just wondering what your share-
holders think about that choice. You have to make money.
DR. MASTRAN: The shareholders believe that if we do not de-
liver quality first, we are not going to remain in business.
PROFESSOR DILLER: There is a question there?
QUESTIONER: In the interest of full disclosure, I am the presi-
dent of a large public-sector union here in New York State. We are
very familiar with the issue of design and construction in the De-
partment of Transportation. Under two state comptrollers, a Re-
publican and a Democrat, it has both been found that state
employees do it cheaper and do it better. An independent consult-
ant who looked at DOT also found that contracted-out employees
do it at a cost that is seventy-five percent higher.
Under those circumstances, we have asked the legislature re-
peatedly to put in place more state employees. They will not do it.
Finally, we said, "Okay, let's do managed competition." We got
legislation passed that put in place a five-year managed competi-
tion between the privates and the publics. Both the Republicans
67. See Greg Garland, Child-Support Collectors Win Praise for Improving System,
BALT. SUN, June 1, 2000, at lB.
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and the Democrats agreed that that was appropriate. The gover-
nor vetoed it on a technicality.
My question is, that even under the most rational basis, we can-
not seem to get politicians to move away from contracting out. So
then, my question is: Would it be appropriate-and I would ask the
panel to comment on this-would it be appropriate to take away
the ability of those that bid on contracts to make political contribu-
tions? Because I have to believe that that is now playing a role.
MS. BURGER: One of the things in our PSAA requires is that
they at least, have to disclose their political contributions, so the
public will know who private bidders have contributed to, which
candidates. But I think that is an interesting question, whether you
could prohibit that or not.
DR. MASTRAN: By the way, I did not hear any of those condi-
tions that you laid out that were objectionable to me. I did not
hear the first one clearly.
MS. BURGER: We will give you a brochure.
DR. MASTRAN: Please.
MS. BURGER: There is actually a card you can sign to pledge.
PROFESSOR DILLER: Maybe we actually can bring about
some consensus here.
DR. MASTRAN: I have tried to work with Andy Stern who is
the head of the SEIU. I went and met with Andy Stern, and I said,
"Look, Andy, what is the problem here? You want happy employ-
ees; we want happy employees. You want good government; we
want good government. Why are we fighting each other? Why
don't we create some kind of relationship that accommodates the
efficiencies of privatization and the security or the feelings that la-
bor has?"
"For example, we are willing to contract or subcontract our
human resources function to the labor union. You are concerned
about grievances, you're concerned about paying benefits? You
can do it."
"We ask that you consider that we have a contract for a certain
period of time. You can participate, and if you want, we will work
with you."
He said, "That sounds great. Let's try it."
Our first trial was in a place I am not going to mention, and it did
not work. The union locals did not want it.
So MAXIMUS is not against working with people to make for
better government. We are willing to do that. I will be glad to look
at SEIU's list.
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In terms of contributions, I do not know about this state's De-
partment of Transportation, but I can tell you any contributions
that we make are publicized, and I think it is fair to say that the
union is one of the largest contributors to the political process.
MS. KRUEGER: As someone who was just running for state
legislature, I actually would support the fact that we desperately
need campaign finance reform at the state level, because we basi-
cally have no accountability for anyone who is in elected office or
running for elective office to have to explain why they took the
money they did and what they do in exchange for it.
There are plenty of better models for us to be following, includ-
ing the campaign finance system that New York City has in place.
But New York State is almost the counter-opposite. After years,
we finally got the state senate to agree that if you are being lobbied
at dinner, you should at least write it down somewhere.
QUESTIONER: I think that it is appropriate that the audience
knows that the private sector contributes fifteen times more than
unions.
PROFESSOR DILLER: Why don't we take another question?
Jack Beermann?
PROFESSOR BEERMANN:6 8 I had two things. First, Ms.
Krueger, your example about the fingerprinting technology-cor-
rect me if I am wrong; I may not have understood it-but it seemed
to me that was a failure of government because they bought some-
thing they did not need. It was not a system of private provision
where the private service vendor bought unnecessary technology at
taxpayer expense. It would seem that the privatized provider of
the services would have an incentive not to buy unnecessary
equipment.
Second, I have never been a big advocate of privatization, but
the more I have heard today, actually, the more I am interested in
it, particularly in the child support enforcement area.
I am wondering, when there is privatization-I do not know how
much of that has ever been privatized-if there are similar exper-
iences with privatized child support enforcement in which the pri-
vate vendors do not do what they are supposed to do and they do
not turn the money over to who is supposed to get it?
MS. KRUEGER: You heard me right. My criticisms were pri-
marily of government failing to have systems in place to make the
68. Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, in Symposium, Rede-
fining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001).
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decisions they ought to be making in what services we ought to be
delivering, how we ought to be delivering them, who we are con-
tracting to, and how we are monitoring it. So you did not mishear
me. I was being critical of government, not the vendors. I was
saying the vendors were doing what they do. They were going out
there to look for new markets to make more money for them-
selves. That is sort of the definition of a for-profit corporation. So
I was not criticizing them for following their mission. I was criticiz-
ing the government for not handling its responsibilities correctly.
I think I should hand it to Jacquelyn on the child support en-
forcement question.
MS. BOGGESS: I just wish you would ask that question one
more time.
PROFESSOR BEERMANN: I am familiar with big-time fail-
ures of government bureaucracies in doing things like going after
child support, providing the paternity enforcement service it is sup-
posed to do, and in turning over the money when and if, it is col-
lected. Often that money sits in the account and never actually
gets turned over to the people who are supposed to get it-at least
in most states, the first $50, even if they are getting full welfare.
MS. BOGGESS: Not in most states.
PROFESSOR BEERMANN: They don't get it anymore. They
used to get the first $50. I just wonder if there have been similar
negative experiences with privatized child support enforcement or
if that is only a problem with government child support enforce-
ment. I do not know whether it has ever been privatized.
MS. BOGGESS: Yes, it has. I do not think that is only a prob-
lem with government child support enforcement. I think it is a
problem all the way around.
In Illinois, the problem, if I am correct, is that, because the law
dictates that collected child support money did not go to women on
welfare, because they were receiving welfare benefits, once they
went off welfare, the money still was not being sent to them, so it
was just being built up in the state's offers. In Illinois, it was said
that the problem was that they could not get the computer systems
necessary to track the money.
I cannot answer your question. I do not think that it is any dif-
ferent between public or privatized child support enforcement as to
whether or not the money is getting across, getting to the women.
DR. MASTRAN: I would like to comment on that. We collect
child support around the country in about fifteen states. If we were
a state, we would be the twenty-second largest in terms of collect-
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ing child support. We have been brought in to improve perform-
ance. The rate of collections in our projects-and again, we can
look at the data; I think the GAO has looked at this-is better than
what these states could do before we took over. So there is child
support privatization out there.
MS. BOGGESS: But his question was not about the rate of
collections.
DR. MASTRAN: Right. What I think he was asking was, were
there the same failures in the privatized child support as there are
in the public, right? I am saying, not that I know of.
MS. BOGGESS: Same thing I said.
DR. MASTRAN: For a mother with two kids who is trying to
collect child support, what I ask them is, "Would you rather have
someone trying to collect your child support who gets paid whether
or not they are successful, or would you rather have someone who
is trying to collect your child support who will only be paid if they
are successful?" That is the difference between privatization and
non-privatization.
MR. RIEMER: I just want to follow up on that point, because I
do think that one of the problems we have with a lot of privatiza-
tion contracts is that they are fixed-price contracts that basically
give the private firm a franchise for a fee. Once that is the case,
they have an incentive to keep their costs down. Some firms will
resist those incentives and other will not. I think that if you can
structure the contract so that you have the dollar amount rising in
proportion to the outcome that you are seeking-so that the pay-
ment is bigger if the child support collections are bigger; in the edu-
cation training area, if the payment made to the firm is bigger
based on the earnings that people get or the percent that get above
the poverty line, or some combination like that.
A fellow, named David Kindig, who is a professor at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin in Madison, has written a book, called Paying for
Health Results,69 which tries to link the payment to HMOs for low-
income people to actual results. The more you can link the dollars
to the rise and fall of a performance, rather than a fixed sum, the
more likely it is to work.
These are the kinds of things, again, that typical government
managers do not think about as much as they ought to, and it is one
of the reasons why they then often design these performance con-
tracts that are flawed.
69. DAVID A. KINDIG, PURCHASING POPULATION HEALTH (1997) (analyzing the
effect of HMOs on the quality of healthcare for individuals with low income).
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DR. MASTRAN: I have a paper that I will make available,
called Privatization Contracts That Work!,70 and it describes how
performance-based contracting should be done and how risk can
be shared between the government and the contractor. That may
be helpful.
MS. BOGGESS: This is the last thing I want to say. The differ-
ence is, in child support enforcement and collection of child sup-
port orders, the amount of money that is given to families. If you
add up all the money that is collected and all the money that is
then passed on to families, the part that is passed on to families is a
fraction of the amount that is kept by the government or by the
private agencies that run child support enforcement.
So I guess it goes back to what I said at the beginning. What is
accountability? What is success? What exactly are we asking? I
think that Dr. Mastran is right. He is doing exactly what the gov-
ernment asks him to do. But what is that? That is the question. Is
it to collect child support?
In Wisconsin, after our state welfare reform legislation passed,
we have "four work tiers." Everybody knows that in Wisconsin
"everybody has a job" and "nobody is poor." We have four work
tiers: one is called unsubsidized work, one is called subsidized
work, one is called CSJ (community service jobs), and one is called
trial jobs.71 I will not go into what each of those means.
But the first category is the one we all love, unsubsidized work.
But a lot of people are put by either the government or the private
organization-and Dr. Mastran would be right if he said "that is
what the government told us to do"-into the unsubsidized job cat-
egory not because they have a job, but because the worker sitting
cross the desk decides that they are job-ready; that is to say, that
client does not have a job and does not receive any kind of cash
benefits at all. That decision is made by someone-correct me if I
am wrong, Dr. Mastran-who works for MAXIMUS.
And then that person-because we have no one on welfare in
Wisconsin -is responsible to do what the Welfare Department
asks them to do, but gets nothing- no money, no child care, no
nothing, so they leave the system. So, in my opinion, privatization
of welfare in Wisconsin is not a success story.
70. David V. Mastran, PRIVATIZATION CONTRACTS THAT WORK! (2001) (on file
with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
71. STATE REG. ALERT, Wisconsin Notices: Workforce Development-Wisconsin
Employment System, Jan. 1, 2001.
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My point again is what has MAXIMUS been asked to do? Well,
he has told us that MAXIMUS has done, and other private organi-
zations have done, what they have been asked to do. That is true.
It seems to me it is our responsibility to find out what they have
been asked to do.
PROFESSOR DILLER: Do you want to respond to that?
DR. MASTRAN: No. I agree with you. I think that we do what
we are asked to do.
In Wisconsin, we are asked to move people through those four
tiers, and we have performance standards, and we have been meet-
ing them. But such a contractual system does require government
do this more effectively, and understand what they want. Some-
times they do not.
QUESTION: Actually my comment is a follow-up to what you
have just been saying. I come from Connecticut. I think we have a
real problem in Connecticut with what the government has con-
tracted with MAXIMUS to do. I am sure that you are meeting the
standards the government has set for you there. At the same time,
Connecticut is last in the country in terms of the percentage of eli-
gible families that are actually getting this child care benefit to
which they are entitled.
I wondered if anyone on the panel, including Dr. Mastran, would
want to comment on that?
DR. MASTRAN: I would like to. The amount of money author-
ized by the legislature is not under our control, so if you are last in
the nation on the amount of child support per capita, or whatever,
we do not have any control over that. But I believe that the situa-
tion in Connecticut has improved dramatically in the past two
years.
MARK WARD:72 Thank you. Just, at least from this voice, one
final question for the day. Yesterday and today in Washington,
D.C., there was the first of what I am presuming will be many de-
bates and discussions about welfare reform reauthorization. There
are many key players there from Capitol Hill, program practition-
ers, and the like.
So focusing for the moment on TANF7 3 service delivery, and
given the fact that reauthorization likely will be discussed this year
and written and implemented in 2002, if you were to take one rec-
ommendation back to Washington as to how to improve the deliv-
72. Mark Ward works for the United States General Accounting Office.
73. Block Grants to States for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 42
U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
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ery of services from an accountability perspective, or from
whatever perspective you want to offer, what would that recom-
mendation be?
MR. RIEMER: I think that the federal government should re-
quire that the states put in place and enforce an outcome measure,
or performance measure, based on the earnings of participants.
The goal of the system should not be caseload reduction. It,
frankly, should not be even what I call sort of "baby steps" toward
earnings, like what was the initial wage rate that you got when you
got a job, or what was the initial length of stay.
The goal is to get people who have a low earnings stream to get a
higher earnings stream, get them enough earnings to get well above
the poverty line. So if the goal is to get low-income adults-custo-
dial parents, non-custodial parents, even childless individuals who
are in that category-to the point where they have income well
above the poverty line, the federal government ought to require
the states to set up systems that pay its vendors, whether it is a
county, MAXIMUS, or a not-for-profit, based on earnings in ex-
cess of the poverty line. The goal ought to be to try to get seventy-
five or eighty or ninety percent of the participants above the pov-
erty line, with an earnings stream above the poverty line, with re-
wards going to states based on the growing distance above the
poverty line.
That would transform dramatically the incentives within the sys-
tem. It also would, for those of you who do not know this, be much
easier to administer, because the states already collect through
their unemployment compensation systems the wages of virtually
every worker, and several states are moving forward to shift from
quarterly collection of wages to almost online or more frequent
collection. So you would have an independent, already systemized,
system of data to use. You would not have to create new forms,
new reports. Basically, you would just have to have the welfare
bureaucrats walk down the hall to the unemployment insurance
bureaucrats and say, "Tell me how these 5000 people did in the last
quarter or the last year compared to where they were before we
entered the system." This would be dramatically better and it
would be very simple to do.
PROFESSOR DILLER: I think I am going to follow up with a
question on how critical performance standards are in all of these
systems. My follow-up question is: Who should decide the per-
formance standards and how should the decision be made?
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MR. RIEMER: You know, you get into these issues of "who is in
charge here," but I think that the federal interest in getting people
sufficient earnings to get out of poverty through work, to attain
self-sufficiency, is so strong that the federal government ought to
set a minimum standard and then allow the states to experiment
above the standard. So, for instance, if the federal government
said "our goal is to have every state pay people based on at least
seventy-five percent getting earnings to at least one hundred per-
cent of the poverty line," but if states want to do more than that
and go to eighty percent or ninety percent or go to one-hundred-
and-five or one-hundred-and-ten percent of the poverty line, they
can.
If I were the federal government, I would not want to contract
with a state, or give a block grant to a state, that basically allowed
it to only do caseload reduction or only say, "Well, all right, we will
just do a little bit of improvement in the initial wage rate, but we
will not pay any attention to whether people actually get an earn-
ings stream to get them out of poverty."
I think that there is a significant enough federal interest here,
grounded in the interstate Commerce Clause 7 and the General
Welfare Provision 75 -so legal-but I think if the federal govern-
ment is paying more than fifty percent of it, I think it is a valid
interest.
And frankly, if the federal government did this, it could strip out
of TANF a lot of the process requirements. 76 A lot of the stuff that
is in there is sort of paperwork junk that somebody stuck in back in
1996 and no one paid any attention to.
So I think this could be done in a way that actually would reduce
the administrative burden on the states. It would not be a burden
to the states to do it. The states could then transfer the burden to
their vendors. They can put it on the counties and county employ-
ees, or they can put it on private vendors and private employees.
So the state itself can shift the risk down to the local level, as it
should.
QUESTION: The fundamental problem in New York has been
that government knows exactly what it wants-it wants lower
caseloads-and it has done a very good job getting that. I wonder
74. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to regulate commerce
between the states).
75. Id.
76. Block Grants to States for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 42
U.S.C. § 608 (2001).
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if in New York there is not the political juice to require govern-
ment or instill in government the interest in doing, for instance,
what Mr. Riemer is describing, increasing the number of people
moving out of poverty. If it does not work in New York, how could
it conceivably work anywhere else? So maybe the federal govern-
ment angle is the way to go.
I wonder what your take is on Tommy Thompson 77 and what his
philosophy might be in Health and Human Services along those
lines?
MR. RIEMER: I do not know, and I think philosophically he
would be more inclined to not be so prescriptive to the states. But,
on the other hand, I think that the Governor, like a lot of Republi-
cans, would be supportive of this. After all, the idea of getting rid
of process and having outcomes is part of what many people in the
Republican Party and the various think tanks have been talking
about.
So I do not think this is anathema to them. There is sort of a
conflict, in a way. If they view the federal government as this en-
tity that just sort of gives the states lots of discretion, then they
would, in one way, be inclined to go against this approach. If they
view the federal government as a business-like organization that
ought to strip out of the system all these process requirements and
rules-maybe even entitlements, an important thing to debate-
but then say, "All right, we have taken all that out, but we really
want outcomes for our money," they go another way and would
support this.
My hope is that if the Bush Administration does not push this,
Congress would do something like this. Maybe if the GAO says it
is really a good idea, they will. Then the Administration may say,
"Well, all right, this was not our idea, but we do not object to it, so
we will sign it." They do not have line item veto power in Washing-
ton, so if they get a bill, they have to kill the whole thing or adopt
the whole thing. So they might take it. They might hold their nose
and say, "Well, we are ambivalent about it, but Congress really
wanted to do this. We are not going to send the whole damn bill
back."
PROFESSOR DILLER: At this point, I would like to thank all
of our panelists for the entire day, and, in particular, to thank you
all for working within the close time constraints that were created
by the richness of the program.
77. Mr. Thompson was Governor of Wisconsin, and is the Secretary of Health and
Human Services under President George W. Bush.
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And also, I would like to thank the audience. I know, from hav-
ing seen the registration sheets beforehand, that this is actually a
remarkable group of people in this room. The questions reflect
that, too. I hope you get a chance to speak with each other out at
the reception that follows.
Before we conclude, I just wanted to thank the staff of the Urban
Law Journal, who put this together: Peter Hatch, Sheri Bonstelle,
Patty O'Connor, and Jessica Pesce. I have worked with the Journal
before and with other journals on putting together conferences,
and I have to say I thought this was a remarkable effort on the part
of the students. The trains ran on time in every respect through-
out-and I do not just mean today; I mean in the months putting
this all together. It is a pleasure to work with them.
If they do not make it in the law, which I do not think will be
true-I think they will all be great lawyers-but if they do not
make it in the law, they certainly have a future in the conference
planning business.
Thank you all.
I think Peter Hatch wanted a concluding word.
MR. HATCH: Thank you.
For those of you who joined us this afternoon, I am Peter Hatch,
the Editor in Chief of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Because
we did manage to bring this Symposium to a conclusion before the
official time, I am going to beg a moment's indulgence.
On behalf of the Journal and, in Dean Feerick's absence, Ford-
ham Law School, I would like to say a few words of thanks.
First, to all of our distinguished panelists and moderators today,
who joined us from all across the country and, as we discovered
during the first panel, all across New York City.
I also would like to thank everyone who joined us in the audi-
ence today for their patience and for their active participation in
contributing to what I think was a very rich dialogue, and an im-
portant one. This will continue to be a key issue that our nation
and localities face.
I need to say a few specific words of thanks. First, to our co-
sponsors, the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics and also to the
William and Burton Cooper Chair on Urban Legal Issues. It was
terrific to work with those institutions on this important
Symposium.
And also to Professor Diller, whose expertise in administrative
law, experience as a public interest lawyer, and affiliations with
both the Stein Center and the Cooper Chair contributed to the suc-
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cess of this Symposium. If I may borrow some of the rhetoric of
today's discussion, without his partnership, this important venture
would not have been the success that it was. So thank you to Pro-
fessor Diller.
And finally, I would like to express my tremendous appreciation
to every member of the Urban Law Journal, and specifically again
to Sheri Bonstelle, Patty O'Connor, and Jessica Pesce, who really
did most of the work over many, many months and late nights put-
ting this all together.
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